This country profile was published in November 2008 in our annual 'Africa in 2009' issue. The next edition, 'Africa in 2010' will be on sale 23 November 2009.

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Further rebel attacks on forces loyal to President Idris Déby Itno cannot be ruled out in 2009, though further fighting would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian conditions for 430,000 Darfuri refugees and displaced Chadians. It would also make international attempts to police the Chad/Sudan border even more complicated. In September 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed that UN forces replace 3,300 EU troops stationed in eastern Chad when their mandate expires. 


Déby’s chief military advantage is the acute divisions among his opponents, many of whom were formerly his close aides and who have now begun to quarrel with each other on ethnic and personal grounds, some lured by fitful Sudanese patronage. Rebel divisions played a major part in the failure of the audacious raid on N’djamena in February 2008 and in the collapse of abortive offensives in the east in June. The president, like his French backers, categorically rejects the need for a ceasefire or negotiations with armed rebels. Instead, Déby’s emissaries assiduously buy off leaders, the lure of cash and sinecures securing a steady stream of defections. 


Whereas Paris and Brussels had backed the putative political accord between Déby and civilian opponents signed under EU auspices in August 2007, the schedule for elections in late 2009 was soon blown off course. In the wake of the February assault on the capital, the press was muzzled and leading civilian opponents were arrested, severely compromising the plan and EU diplomacy. The still unexplained circumstances of the death of Ibni Oumar Saleh, a leading opponent of Déby and key architect of the accord, stand as a stark warning to those who seek political compromise. 


The EU force in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR) is due to withdraw on 15 March 2009. EUFOR’s heavily armed units from 20 EU states – plus contingents from Albania and Ukraine, with Russian helicopter crews due to arrive – have proved cumbersome to deploy and ill-adapted to combating widespread banditry in the east. The UN is supposed to replace EUFOR and expand its associated, far smaller and currently ineffectual mission, MINURCAT. In mid-2008, Ban Ki-moon admitted that the mandates of EUFOR and MINURCAT were focused on the humanitarian consequences of the Chadian conflict rather than its political causes.


The president’s military position is buttressed by cash; windfall oil revenues, estimated at $1.3bn for 2008, fuel arms purchases and fund lucrative patronage for Chadian and Darfuri militias. Déby has unfettered control of oil revenues since the abandonment of the World Bank’s tarnished oil revenue management agreement. Although its endorsement of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline was critical to Exxon Chad’s $4bn investment in the Doba oilfields, the Bank has been powerless to enforce its conditionalities. 


French and EU diplomats hoped in April that their backing of a new premier and a cabinet which included four veteran opposition figures might curb corruption and prompt rapprochement with donors and civilian opponents. This proved illusory; in September Déby appointed Ngata Ngoulou as Chad’s third successive finance minister in six months. The veteran banker may partially appease donors but he will be as powerless as his predecessors to curb corruption or stimulate growth. Economic growth under 1.7% is anticipated for 2008, with inflation at 10%, widespread insecurity, lacklustre agricultural output and a cotton sector starved of investment.