This country profile was published in November 2008 in our annual 'Africa in 2009' issue. The next edition, 'Africa in 2010' will be on sale 23 November 2009.

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Somalia has continued its freefall into armed violence, political collapse and humanitarian crisis. It is now considered by many as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the worst instance of state failure, the most corrupt environment, the top site for piracy and the most dangerous place for aid workers. Things show every indication of getting worse before getting better, but there are also signs of change on the horizon, some of which could provide an opportunity for reduced insecurity.


The principal driver of the crisis is the conflict between Islamist resistance fighters and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) backed by the Ethiopian army. Since Ethiopian forces defeated the Union of Islamic Courts and occupied Mogadishu in 2007, 700,000 Somalis have been internally displaced, and much of the capital has been turned into a ghost town. The opposition to the TFG has been winning decisively, despite a split between the hardline Al Shabaab and militias affiliated with the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), as well as other autonomous groups. As of October 2008, the TFG controlled only a small portion of the capital, an area around Baidoa and the region of Puntland, the home territory of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf. 


TFG forces have devolved into autonomous paramilitaries and gangs, responsible for looting and assaults in Mogadishu, and armed roadblocks. Unaffiliated gangs add to the general insecurity in the capital and countryside. Worse, Al Shabaab as well as the TFG are suspected of conducting a wave of political assassinations against anyone suspected of collaboration with the adversary. This has hit civil society leaders and aid workers especially hard.


The TFG administration has evaporated, existing only on paper and in exile. Hopes were raised early in 2008 when problematic figure Ali Mohamed Gedi was replaced as Prime Minister by Nur Hassan Hussein ‘Adde’, who won support by making an unconditional offer to meet with the opposition in pursuit of peace. Talks between him and the two moderate leaders of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Sharif Hassan, produced the Djibouti Accord in mid-2008, which pledged the opposition and government to a ceasefire and a process for a unity government, while calling for a UN peace operation and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. But the signatories do not control the main armed groups in Mogadishu and are opposed by hardliners in their own camps. The two Sharifs have no control over Al Shabaab, while Nur Adde has no authority over TFG security forces and is locked in a serious political struggle with Yusuf. Political fragmentation is likely to continue, with virtually every grouping, including Al Shabaab, splitting over tactics, ideology and clan. 


Ethiopia has absorbed significant costs in its prolonged occupation, and most analysts concur that Addis Ababa would like to find a way to withdraw at least partially. That could occur if the Djibouti Accord is implemented. To that end, Ethiopia has shifted its support to Nur Adde and has pressed Yusuf to accept the accord. If Yusuf were to be forced to resign, his home region of Puntland might abandon the already depleted TFG. All of this has created enormous uncertainty. “The jigsaw puzzle pieces have all been thrown in the air, and we’re waiting for them to land” is how one regional analyst described the state of confusion.