This country profile was published in November 2008 in our annual 'Africa in 2009' issue. The next edition, 'Africa in 2010' will be on sale 23 November 2009.

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The end of the Southern African winter brought no guarantee of comfort to Zimbabweans buffeted by their country’s political tempest and its still-accelerating economic fallout. With ministry allocations frozen, internecine quarrels replaced consensus and threatened to tear the fragile patchwork of September’s power-sharing agreement.


Under the terms of the deal brokered by South Africa’s former-President Thabo Mbeki, the ‘unity government’ was supposed to have a five-year term, with its primary obligation to resuscitate the economy and to rein in runaway inflation in the wake of the contentious elections that dominated events in the first eight months of 2008. Robert Mugabe, who was to remain commander-in-chief as well as president, was entitled to appoint 15 ministers, compared to 13 by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader and prime minister-designate Morgan Tsvangirai and three by MDC faction leader (and deputy premier-designate) Arthur Mutambara. In view of Mugabe’s long practice in processes of political co-option, no one was under any illusion about how tenuous the opposition’s position could become in the weeks after the agreement was reached.


The share-out of some 25 ministries was agreed in the early rounds of discussions but there was deadlock over five principal ministries: information, finance, home affairs, local government and foreign affairs. Even if a compromise were to be reached swiftly under the weakened arbitrage of Mbeki, there could be no guarantee of success.


Any constitutional amendments need a two-thirds majority to be approved, which potentially gave disgruntled Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) MPs a way to stall meaningful change. Moreover, ZANU-PF is not united behind the new government, with one political bureau member reportedly accusing Mugabe, before he left to attend the UN General Assembly after the deal, that he had ceded too much power to the MDC.


In the wings of the main political theatre lurked two would-be presidential understudies, rural housing minister Emmerson Mnangagwa and vice-president Joyce Mujuru, whose respective ZANU-PF factions continued to jostle for influence. Mnangagwa was in the ascendant when he was left in charge of the country’s powerful Joint Operations Committee – a meeting of the top securocrats – while Mugabe was in New York. Mnangagwa had the apparent support of generals (such as retired army General Vitalis Zvinavashe) who feared prosecution if they were to be frozen out of the new dispensation. Others, like police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, were more cautious.


As the deadlock persisted in the wake of the deal, the stakes were still high. Any chance of a Mnangagwa presidency would definitely undermine a donor-led recovery and hence the big international lenders and donors were choosing to sit on their hands to see how the details worked out. For as long as Mugabe himself remained at the top, the donors wanted to see Tsvangirai exercise real power before they were prepared to disburse aid.


The rise to power of South Africa’s new President Kgalema Motlanthe could shift the balance in favour of Tsvangirai, who had regularly accused Mbeki of being too pro-government. It was unclear whether Motlanthe might take a firmer line with Mugabe but the South African trade union power-base underpinning his elevation was deeply dissatisfied with the agreement. A spokesman for the Congress of South African Trade Unions said the movement was “profoundly unhappy with the negotiations on the table” and dismissed what he called an “elite deal negotiated between a few individuals, with no attempt to involve civil society”.


Many of Tsvangirai’s civil society allies concurred with this view, although the prime minister-designate could bring the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) – which advocates a transitional authority followed by internationally monitored elections – on board. Accompanied on tours by his advisers Ian Makone, Eddie Cross and Wellington Chadehumbe, Tsvangirai was initially busy holding meetings with business leaders, farmers, the mining sector, NGOs and civil society groups.


The ZCTU argued that Mugabe still held the real power. Other analysts disagree. Harare-based political analyst and former ZANU-PF official Ibbo Mandaza said that Tsvangirai held the balance of power in the council of ministers; it would be up to him to “build a non-partisan coalition out of disparate interests”.


Investors felt that any recovery would depend upon a successful rapprochement with the international community and the enactment of serious reforms. A September report from the UN Development Programme said Zimbabwe needs about $5bn in foreign aid over the next five years to rebuild, with an immediate disbursement of $1.6bn. To unlock donor funds, Tsvangirai will have to push reforms in the face of ZANU-PF’s hardliners. The first test would be the government’s ability to deliver a package of economic deregulation, including deep cuts in spending, the stabilising of the ballooning national debt and independence for the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, which would have control over interest rates. One World Bank official said that the idea of replacing the Zimbabwe dollar with South Africa’s rand was being mooted.


Amidst the bickering, the humanitarian situation has been deteriorating weekly. The Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights has warned of a serious health crisis in urban areas due to a lack of running water. Cholera outbreaks have been reported in Harare and Chitungwiza, 30 km south of the capital. 
The countryside is worse off. After six years of successive poor harvests, food shortages have developed into a full-blown crisis, with sporadic reports of children dying from malnutrition-related diseases. The last time such levels of malnutrition were seen was in the severe drought of 1991/92. 


Many rural families are reduced to eating one (nutritionally-lacking) meal a day – typically sadza maize meal – and subsistence stocks are nearly depleted. Those with livestock have been selling their animals at punitive rates in return for food. In Masvingo, one goat is selling for 5kg of maize.


The UN has reported that maize production in Zimbabwe for 2008 will be an estimated 575,000 tonnes. Most aid agencies estimate that production is around 1.5m tonnes short. According to a UN assessment, 2m people were in need of assistance in October and this would rise to 5.1m, nearly half Zimbabwe’s population, by early 2009, at the height of the hungry season between January and March. With a widespread lack of fertilisers, there is little prospect of a better harvest next year.

Investors waiting in the wings

According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe advisor Eric Bloch, several multinational companies are interested in investing as much as $3bn over the medium term in the Zimbabwean economy. Most of the immediate money would go to industries that could be revived quickly with minimum recapitalisation.


Tourism, some agricultural manufacturing and mining would be the first to benefit. Gold, diamonds and platinum are a substantial draw. South Africa’s Impala Platinum has pledged $400m in the event of a turnaround. UK mining giant Rio Tinto said it would invest $250m on its Murowa diamond mine. Other investors were interested in coal and methane gas.


Lonrho CEO Geoffrey White spoke of ‘cautious optimism’ following the power-sharing deal. He told The Africa Report that $65m was available from the firm’s Zimbabwe fund, with more capital to come within the next six months. Botswana-based Imara Capital saw its asset portfolio triple in value to $60m two days after the agreement and said Zimbabwe could attract much more than that if reforms were enacted purposefully.