Sudan: How battle for control is blocking transition process

Since the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) could not come to an agreement on the details of the reform process in the security sector, the expected signing on 1 April was delayed.

Perhaps the current blockages in the political process is a sign of the biggest disease that has been plaguing Sudan’s transition since it began in 2019 and caused it to stumble until it ended with the coup on 25 October 2021: the desire to politicise the reforms in the state apparatus and use them to garner as many political gains as possible for the different parties.

This approach has unfortunately resulted in the prioritisation of political interests over the tasks of the transition, ultimately hindering it.

Doomed from the beginning

From the start, this approach has hampered the task of reforming the security and military sectors. Military components, whether in the army or the RSF, have resisted this process since the start of the transitional era, obstructing any practical measures to move it forward.

It is a travesty that the framework agreement signatories used disinformation and propaganda to portray their return to power as a victory for the people’s will.

Official political discourse and action on security sector reform were confined to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) related security arrangements. The failure to initiate and advance this process was one of the primary factors that paved the way for the coup on 25 October 2021.

The political process launched by the Forces of Freedom and Change – Central Council (FFC-CC) with the coup leaders has deviated from the initial target of restoring Sudan’s civil democratic transition. Instead, it has devolved into a cheap effort to reclaim power, with no regard for the necessary subsequent reform processes in the state machinery – both civil and military, required for the transition.

It is a travesty that the framework agreement signatories used disinformation and propaganda to portray their return to power as a victory for the people’s will. In reality, people remain sceptical of the stagnant process and its potential ramifications.

Furthermore, the putchists’ fluctuating alliances with political forces, notably their shift from the side of the alliance with the Democratic Bloc to dealing with the Central Council, have made this political process partial in its design, participants, and issues addressed, thereby jeopardising the ability of its outputs to achieve any stability, let alone restore the path of transition.

‘Immunity from accountability’

They asked themselves, what does the military want? “Immunity from accountability!” They granted them immunity, but “nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what they do not have)”, so they subsequently attempted to bring this to fruition through discussions on the issue of transitional justice.

They looked at transitional justice practices in Colombia and South Africa, but failed to address political accountability in the context of the crimes committed. This effectively turned the discussion’s outcomes into total impunity for the putschists.

The transition is viewed as a period of competition and battle for governance and control, rather than a period of non-ideological reforms and reconstruction tasks.

The deal was further sweetened by participating in the whitewashing of the Rapid Support Forces and its commander, Hemeti, which continued to reintroduce him as an ally of the democratic forces as a foundation of their growing alliance.

The workshop to address the problems of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) was conducted without the participation of the majority of the agreement’s signatories, and without any real discussions about what these problems are on the ground.

The workshop was repeated in Juba for those who did not attend the Khartoum version, and both concluded without substantial recommendations to address the real issues of JPA implementation, which is the same disease afflicting the Sudanese transition.

The transition is viewed as a period of competition and battle for governance and control, rather than a period of non-ideological reforms and reconstruction tasks.

‘Highest number of coups and attempted coups’

Political disputes in Sudan were always prone to military power and influence capable of overthrowing any democratic system. This has put Sudan at the top of the list of African nations with the highest number of coups and attempted coups.

The military and security reform process are not an appropriate arena for political manoeuvring.

This has been a mistake by the FFC – and those who travel with them – when they attempt to construct a democratic structure with repressive instruments.

The Rapid Support Forces was established during the Bashir era as one of the weapons of repression and civil war; given its deep roots, it cannot be transformed overnight into a tool for constructing democracy and civilian political life.

Not to mention that Hemeti and his forces spared no effort in engaging in regional and international issues and affairs, in a way that reveals its leader’s ambitions to use these forces as an instrument for his political ambitions inside and outside of Sudan.

On the other hand, the Sudanese army is infected with the disease of practising politics. Sudan’s prolonged history of military rule, most recently during the infamous alliance between the National Islamic Front and the Militaria, which ruled the country for the past 30 years, transformed the doctrine of the armed forces in its understanding of its relationship with the state apparatus from a role of “protection” to one of “guardianship.”

The military considers itself an entity above the state apparatus and not part of it, thus having the right to exert undue influence over the government and its policies.

The evidence for this extends from General Burhan’s statements to the overwhelming feeling of “the military strategists,” who consider that any nonsense they say on TV are words of wisdom and truth which should convince everyone.

Reforming the institution

This process aims to restore the natural role that state-owned weapons should perform within the normal setting of state apparatus roles: to reinstate the military and security institutions to their normal positions as one of the professional service services.

Its subordination to civilian oversight and management, and the implementation of policies decided by the leadership of the executive branch would be similar to that of other state agencies, such as the ministry of health, the department of social welfare, and the department of education.

[…] many actors in the process are simply seeking to ensure their participation in the next government, rather than follow through on any democratic transformation.

As early as the initial phase of the political process, international mediators have recognised the shift in the process’s nature and objectives.

Perhaps it was a slip of the tongue or intended reference mentioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Volker Perthes, in his recent report on 20 March, that many actors in the process are simply seeking to ensure their participation in the next government, rather than follow through on any democratic transformation.

International mediators need clarity

That is why international mediators and their staff — in the UN, ambassadors, the AU, IGAD, and others — brazenly repeat strange arguments as if they were logical constants.

• Such as Burhan’s reluctance to accept the army’s submission to an unelected civilian government and accepting his refusal to submit to a civilian oversight as merely a political stance.
• Or Hemeti not objecting to being part of the army but does not want to answer to the commander-in-chief of the army. Instead, he would rather answer to the head of state, whose duties are mostly ceremonial. This then makes the commander-in-chief neither commander nor chief.

All of these items are treated as if they make sense in Sudan’s Wonderland. The international mediators are certain that these hiccups are just part of a power struggle and not an attempt to set up a path towards a different transition.

Conspicuously, the international community and its mediators are now attempting to reach an agreement… any agreement, in any form.

Some, if not the majority, of the international staff and envoys have shifted their attention to celebrating the successful conclusion of a political process, regardless of what its results will be or whether they serve the goals of the revolution and contribute to stability and democracy in Sudan.

This will not affect them in any way; it is simply an accomplishment or point added to their resumes.

They are aware, as are we, that the texts of the agreements in Sudan are largely meaningless and that the formation of the next government will have the greatest impact on the course of events.

We must continue to highlight the quandaries and complexities created by current agreements and plan to deal with them. The Sudanese are shaping their future with their choices, and the road is being made by walking. Either we choose the right path to create a better future or we keep walking in closed circles that take us back to the past.